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in primitive accumulation, simultaneously a process of emancipation and freedom for laborers from serfdom and the guilds and a violent history of expropriation and violence 'fwritten in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire" (1977:875). But the unprecedented rural-urban migration involving roughly 100 million free laborers, whose labor power has fed the engine of China's postsocialist accumulation since the early 1980s, is not based on the forced expropriation of land, as described by Marx more than 100 years ago. It is, ironically, based on the distribution of once collectively owned and managed land to individual rural households for production and management. Rural reform the reapportioning of collective land to individual peasant households as accounting units, which is known as the '4household responsibility system" or "decollectiviza- In what follows, I track the discursive conditions and contradictions embedded in the struggles and agonies of subaltern subjectivity. I argue that labor mobility cannot be singularly celebrated, as many political observers inside and outside China have done, as a new form of freedom to be realized in the transition from a planned to a market economy. What analysts have overlooked a key focus of this article-is how post-Mao development has robbed the countryside of its ability to serve as a locus for rural youth to construct a meaningful identity. Hence, rural young women's invocation of the countryside as a field of death. I argue that young migrant women's pursuit of a modern subjectivity, situated in the culture of modernity produced by post-Mao development, has to be understood in the context of a reconfigured rural-urban relationship in China's restructured political economy. I further argue that embedded in the post-Mao culture of modernity is an epistemic violence against the countryside that spectralizes the rural in both material and symbolic practices. This essay excavates and foregrounds how the post-Mao shift in urban-rural relationships, the "spectralization of the rural" (Spivak 2000) , is constitutive of rural young women's desire for the city, and it traces such women's struggles with the impasse posed by the discursive violence of post-Mao modernity itself.3
To capture the epistemic discontinuity in rural women's migration before and after the post-Mao reform, I compare and analyze women's migrancy in the 1970s and in the 1980s-9Os. Rural women who migrated during these two periods did so in different discursive contexts, their experiences shaped by different modernity projects in the Maoist and post-Mao eras. I examine the experiences of two cohorts for two reasons. First, the experiences of rural young women in the late l990s and the conundrum they faced cannot be properly captured without examining the radical post-Mao shift in the rural-urban relationship and how this shift has impressed itself on rural young women's subjectivity. Second, my focus on the two cohorts allows me to situate my analysis in the growing discussion of modernity or modernities in anthropology. My analysis speaks of modernities in the plural, not in terms of essentialized cultures to forward a Chinese brand of modernity, but in terms of historicity to examine the tension and discontinuity in social processes and thus to offer a critique of the teleology of capitalist modernity that is becoming hegemonic in China and elsewhere. 4 The data are drawn from my fieldwork in rural villages in Wuwei, Anhui Province, and in Beijing in 1998-2000. My interviews in Wuwei included 104 women in 12 villages in three townships. I interviewed 88 women who had migrancy experience; 13 were over 40 years of age and had migrated by themselves before and during the 1970s; and 75 were between their late teens and early thirties and had migrated in the mid-1980s and mostly in the l990s.5 My interviews in Beijing were conducted with women from a number of provinces, includingAnhui.
"Rural women," state, patnarchy: A small exodus of rural women in the 1970s
Wuwei County lies in southeastAnhui Province, north ofthe Yangtze River, its southern border defined and often threatened by the river. A base for rice and cotton growing, Wuvfei has 1.34 million mu of agricultural land and a rural population of 1.2 million, about 92 percent of its total population.6 Wuwei was once a base in Anhui for the communist New Fourth Army, which resisted the Japanese invasion of China in World War II. Local legend has it that some New Fourth Army officers left their young children in the care of local women during the war. Because of this connection, shortly after the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, some of these women were given employment by veterans as domestics in Beijing. This established the link for later migration.7 It is estimated that three to four thousand rural women from Wuwei had worked as domestics in the cities up to the 1970s (Wang and Li 1996:23 In this section I analyze the double burden of gender and rural origins shouldered by women in the countryside in the Maoist era and critique the participation of state and patriarchy in the discursive construction of the subject position nongrun funu (rural women). But I also show that rural migrants of the period nevertheless positively claimed a "rural woman" identity through their participation in agricultural labor and asserted that this identity was undiminished by their migration experiences.
Great Aunt was 65 years old when I met her in 1999 in Beijing. Living with her son and daughter-in-law in a singleroom house in the suburbs of Beijing, she looked after her one-year-old grandson and cooked for the young couple while they went out everyday to sell processed chicken in the market. A mother of four children, Great Aunt first came to Beijing from Wuwei more than 20 years ago to work as a domestic (ayi, lit. auntie, or baomu). Sitting in the courtyard, she told me about her experiences of migrancy. In the following excerpt she described her daily labor in the field and at home during the collective period of the Maoist era:
Then we had the production team leader and the accountant leading us. The production leader blew his whistle, calling out, "Hurry up" [to summon us to work] . Our production team leader at that time, how should I say it, was a single stick [unmarried] . After he went home and was done with his eating, he's all finished. But we had to take care of our children, wash them and then cook. Every morning I got up before dawn: cooking breakfast, washing diapers, feeding the baby, cleaning around the house. I got up before there was any light. After the breakfast was cooked, I ate hurriedly. Then I had to wash rice and fetch water from the river. When I heard the call, I left for the field. Sometimes I hadn't got a chance to really finish eating myself, because I had to feed the baby first, right? And then during the work break, I would hurry home and cook rice for lunch. I got it boiling and almost done, and then I had to rush back to the field. It's the same thingwhen we came back home around noon. We first lit the stove. Then while the children's father [her husband] cooked dishes, I fed the youngest baby. After lunch, I would wash dishes, the wok, and diapers and feed the baby again before leaving [for the field]. During the busy season like now [summer], we wouldn't come home until seven or eight o'clock. We worked with no end, yet we didn't always have enough to eat.
Great Aunt spoke with excitement and sighs of frustration. She also remembered with a hearty smile how her fellow villagers in the production team remarked on her ability to carry full loads of sludge on a shoulder pole balanced above her slender 'swater snakelike waist." She drew a certain pride and heroism from this public recognition. She remembered the days of collective labor as bustling with communitybased activities in the field and in the village, with women's labor contribution publicly recognized and compensated in terms of work points, which gave women some standing in the public arena. In the post-Mao era, when production responsibility was contracted to each individual household, rural women in Great Aunt's village witnessed a loss of the limited ground they had gained in the public arena. With the demise of the collective communal life, rural women's status has substantially contracted, and the public sphere now belongs more exclusively to men.
With three small children, Great Aunt's family experienced food shortages in the collective era. To earn a bit more money, Great Aunt went to work for families in Beijing in the late 1970s. The predicament for rural women like Great Aunt during the Maoist period was that they were subjected to the double postponement deployed in the discursive category of "rural woman" by the party-state, whose political-economic policies were formulated to service national industrialization.9 The Maoist state was determined to achieve fast industrialization and nationwide accumulation, a necessary step toward resolving the material and technological difference between the countryside and the city and the "price scissors" (price differential) between industrial products and agricultural products.l° In the meantime, to maximize the surplus value of industrial output for accumulation and expanding production, the state practiced price control through a unified procurement system. This system established a state monopoly over surplus agricultural products and kept prices for agricultural products at a consistently low level.ll The economic development of the peasantry was put on hold, although the leadership at that time did not imagine that the wait would be long.l2
For rural women, this postponement was accompanied by the "postponement" of gender equality, which allowed for a persistent, albeit sometimes restrained, patriarchy in the domestic division of labor and in the organization and rewarding of collective labor.l3 Thus, for peasant women like Great Aunt, the subject position of rural woman in the postliberation period was, on the one hand, highlighted by active participation in collective labor and surplus production for the industrialization of the socialist state and, on the other hand, marked by a continuation, although constrained, of the patriarchal structure that defined the kind and value of women's labor. Certainlythe gender politics in the Maoist era that based gender liberation and equality on women's participation in public labor enabled women like GreatAunt to draw a new sense of pride from their active performance in collective labor.l4 The liberation of women from the burden of housework, however, was expected to be realized through the eventual socialization and mechanization of domestic labor rather than by challenging the gendered division of labor. One may argue that the surplus labor performed by a woman on top of her own participation in public la-5.0 teams.l6 The sprouting across the nation of Iron Girl groups, which were modeled after a group of rural adolescent girls of the Dazhai production brigade, became a sign of the liberated productivity of Chinese women outside the domestic closure, on whose base gender equality was claimed (Honig and Hershatter 1988). The rise of the Iron Girls to legendary national honor and prominence displaced and obliterated the funu, who was situated in reformed patriarchal domestic relations, who was working under a double burden, and whose contribution to collective labor was less valued than that of a man.l7 Aunt Lu, who is related to Great Aunt and who also went to Beijing in the late 1970s, came of age during the Cultural Revolution, when she was an activist in the youth performance troupe organized in her village to heighten and cheer on villagers' participation in politics and production. She went to Beijing several years after she was married, after her first child was born. In her narrative she portrayed herself as a spirited activist, dynamic and mobile in her community during her teens, and as a burdened woman after she was married and became a mother. "You could not have guessed that I was once very active in the village performance troupe, could you?" she asked me, with a trace of nostalgia in her voice. Aunt Lu's question cannot be reduced to a personal nostalgia for her youth. The phrase "you could not have guessed" alerted me to the disjuncture between her life as an activist young woman and her life as a burdened married woman, a disjuncture that was discursive.
It was in the context of this disjuncture between rural youth and married women and of the double burden borne by married women that there occurred a small exodus of women out of Wuwei to big cities. There they worked as domestics and sought redress by their own means of the problems posed for rural women by the discursive and material practices of the socialist period. Great Aunt left the village for Beijing to get more return for her doubly undervalued agricultural labor, undervalued once by the state as peasant labor and again by the patriarchal social structure as woman's labor. Almost all of the rural Wuwei women who went to work as domestics in the cities in the 1970s, the late period of the Maoist era, were already married and had children. Most of them were illiterate or semi-illiterate. In the 1970s the monthly wage for a domestic was between 18 and 25 yuan, or roughly $10-$14.18 At a time when the annual household income for a peasant family was about one to two hundred yuan a year, migrant women's earnings were an important subsidy to the family economy.l9
Yet the income contribution of these women was socially circumscribed, as it was vaguely but palpably associated with the socially transgressive meanings of this particular form of labor. The phrase used to refer to working for a wage as a domestic is zaa ren jaa bang gong tworking as a helper in another home) and is sometimes uttered with a slightly detectable tinge of embarrassment by such workers bor to put food on the table to enable her husband's full participation in production, mirrored the peasantry's contribution of surplus labor to enable the nation's accumulation and industrialization. The final liberation of rural women from their burdens was presumed to be contingent on further industrialization, which was to make the expansion of urban-based industrialization all the more compelling in the national agenda and women's labor contribution all the more necessary. Postponement was thus a matter of awaiting improvement of technology and socialization rather than recognized as a discursive practice.ls Writing of the genealogy offunu (women) as the principal subject position available to women in Chinese socialism, Tani This is not to say that the state's concern for women is not genuine, but the relationship between the ideologies of kinship and the state as they have emerged over the several centuries are so interwoven that their disarticulation was perhaps never a conscious goal of China's revolution. [1989:317] Although their participation in collective labor and the recognition of their labor contribution in the form of work points accorded rural women a visibility for their work and a limited degree of equality (cf. Davin 1975) , the continued presence of the patriarchal structure defined the work performed by women as nei (inside) and hence categorically worth fewer work points than the work performed by men, which was deemed wai (outside; see Harrell 2000; Jacka 1997). During the time of collective labor in Wuwei villages, as elsewhere, the highest number of work points for a male laborer was ten per day, whereas the highest possible number of work points for a female laborer was typically eight, even when she performed the same task as a man. Besides taking part in collective labor, a married woman still shouldered most domestic labor in a family whose head (iazhang) was most often her husband.
It was, then, perhaps no coincidence that in the radical years of the Cultural Revollltion (1966-76), the protoimage of women's liberation through enthusiastic participation in public labor was found in female youth groups, the Iron Girl stores, and so on, enabled by the power of socialist discourse of women's liberation, the small number of rural women in the city working as domestics, who appeared and disappeared now and then around the corners of the residential alleys, could not fit into the new subject position for women produced by such discourse. They were fragments of socialism, whose presence was somewhat incongruent with the grand view of socialism and women's liberation and whose discursive value was their awkward connection with the old society through domestic service.
In both the city and the countryside, these rural migrant women were transgressors: In the countryside they had transgressed the sphere of local patriarchy and thus raised anxiety about their gendered personhood; in the city they were transgressors of the proper subject position of rural woman as defined by ideologically espoused heroic agricultural labor, and they reinvoked the specter of the past through domestic service. This notion of transgression and contamination thus constitutes a vague source of shame for these women vague because it is caught uneasily between the state ideology of women's liberation and the continued presence of patriarchal power that defines what a proper woman is through the spatial circumscription of her labor. In attempting to get a higher return for their labor through migration, these women found themselves in the cornered space produced by a triangulation of discourses: the undervaluation of rural women's agricultural labor, the circumscriptive power of local patriarchy to define the propriety of their labor, and the invisibility of domestic service in state discourse.
In this cornered space, the silence of the state discourse where domestic service was concerned failed to grant these women a subject position from which they could speak back to the local patriarchy about their labor. Thus, the state was complicit with the power of the local patriarchy in marking the position of rural migrant women as unclear and unclean, or bu qingshuang, as one village man put it. The money a woman earned and brought home could be denigrated by her husband or others as bu qingshuang, ambiguous and vague, beyond visionary or interpretive certainty and clarity. Women's domestic labor performed outside the proper locus and the field of gaze of the local patriarchy therefore seemed to lack discursive accountability, rendering these women ambiguous in personhood.2l And women could not speak for themselves in this discourse. On the one hand, within the state discourse, rural women could not "speak bitterness" about the double burden piled on their backs and about the double undervaluation of their labor.22 On the other hand, within the discourse of local patriarchy, these women found it shameful to speak bitterness about their paid domestic service in the cities. The women I interviewed often sighed when reminiscing about their migration: "If it had not been so hard at home, who would have wanted to take the suffering outside?" One woman in her late forties themselves. They use these words only when they have to. When they do, their voices seem to lose their usual substantiality and become a bit uncertain. Once the context is established, they tend to use na (that) to substitute for the phrase.
Where is the source of the shame that makes these women somewhat embarrassed to speak of their labor? If this shame circumscribed the articulation of the migration experiences of married women, it made it almost unthinkable for unmarried women to migrate before the early 1980s. It is in contemplating the "unthinkable" that one gets close to understanding the construction of shame. When I asked the head of women's work in a township government in Wuwei why no young women "went out" in the 1970s and why the small number who did were all married, she replied, "Then people's minds were closed (fenbi) and feudal Mengiian). If girls had gone out, they would have had problems in getting married." When I posed a similar question to a male intellectual based in the provincial capital, who is himself from rural Anhui, he responded, "Men would find it a problem because they would think, 'How can you serve others before you serve me first?' " The "others" he referred to were non-kin men outside the patrilineal descent group and patrilocal residence-based comfnunity. A young woman's chastity was not just a matter of sexual purity but was also expressed by the bounded location of her labor performance within the local patriarchy.20 If a woman performed labor by herself away from kin and her home, the sphere of local patriarchy, her chastity could not be locally controlled and defined and could be called into question. By perforrning her paid domestic labor for other people, particularly other men, it was as if she had "prostituted" her labor, challenging her husband's first-order claim to her domestic labor.
On the urban front where these women worked, they embodied a trace of the past in the socialist present. A1-though the state approved the employment of domestic service for the high-ranking cadres and intellectual elite throughout much of the Maoist period, such employment could potentially signify a specter of class associated with the old society. The specter of the old society embodied in such employment was the very point of attack by radical Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution against the bourgeois lifestyle of high-rank officials. Although the state indirectly paid domestics by allocating an allowance for such employment in high-ranking cadres' salaries, it never attempted to incorporate this service openly into the socialist relations of production and to make domestics into state or collective employees. Domestics were also seen by the state and urban society as attached to the employer family and were not integrated into neighborhood life. Instead, hiring and firing were carried out in the private domestic sphere of employers, invisible from the public relations of production. Although the post-Mao cities have a tremendous appetite for cheap migrant youth labor, the presence of large numbers of "low-quality strangers" in big cities also has ignited tremendous anxiety among residents there about the ambiguity and excess of migrants' movements; migrants are viewed as blind drifters (mang liu) and "errant waters" (Solinger 1999:1) that require social control.25 The figure of the migrant thus finctions as a sign of a renewed need for governmentality and order in the post-Mao market economy. Another discursive dimension, however, developed in the mid-to late l990s, with a significant contribution by some liberal scholars, toward a view of the movement of migrants as a desirable form of labor flexibility and of the migrants as the foremost flexible individual agents of the expanding, ascending, but capricious market economy. This positive perception was offset by the new angst over the lack of such flexibility among the growing number of unemployed urban ended her narrative red-eyed, "It's bitter to be outside. Yet with the bitterness we ate outside, it is also embarrassing [lit. it also makes me look ugly] to speak of it at home" [zai wai mian shou de ku, hui lai jEang hai chou] . The embarrassment in their narratives was counterbalanced by assertions of their contributions to the family economy and by detailed and sometimes sobbing descriptions of how lonely it was to be in the city and how much theyworried about their young children at home. Through such recitations, they assertively located the place of their belonging and their identity in the family and the community.
Great Aunt continued to work in Beijing after land distribution to her household in the early 1980s because her family needed her income to purchase agricultural tools and, later, fertilizer and pesticide to carry out production and to pay for increased tuition for her children's education. She later went back to Wuwei and stayed at home for three or four years. Six or seven years ago, she once again migrated to Beijing with her son and daughter-in-law, to help them with their domestic work and to look after her grandson. Unlike GreatAunt, most ofthe earlymigrantwomen returned home after decollectivization, when their labor was needed to farm the responsibility land distributed to their households. When I was in Wuwei, 76-year-old Grandmother Four, who found employment for a number of Wuwei women in Beijing as domestics in the 1970s, including Great Aunt andAunt Lu, returned to her village for good after working as a domestic in Beijing herself since 1951. When I asked Grandmother Four and several women whether they found it easy to get back to rural life after working in the cities, they replied, "We did not have a comfortable time [xiangfiX] when working outside. Why would we not be used to being back?" Grandmother Four described returning to her village as a homecoming. The woman in her late forties who was embarrassed at having spoken bitterness about working as a domestic replied to my question as she picked up her shoulder pole, preparing to leave for the field, "I'm farming 20 mu of land with my husband. Had I changed, how could I have done this?"23 By giving rhetorical answers to my question, these women subtly contested its legitimacy and affirmed their continued identity as rural women undiminished by their migrancy proudly demonstrating their linkage with rural life and agricultural labor and production. In fact I was made to feel that my question was quite misplaced. Perhaps by aiEming and positively daiming their "rural woman" subject position so forcefully, they tried to render any questioning about their identity and personhood illegitimate and irrelevant, including questioning from the circumscriptive power of local patriarchy.
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workers shed by the restructured state-owned enterprises during the reforms of the l990s. Thus, new social value has been invested in the sign of the migrant compared with its new negative double, the laid-off urban worker, just as the "dynamic" market economy, growing in volume and volubility, is positively paired against the "inflexible" planned economy.
Rather than framing migration as individuals responding to push-pull forces, I interpret it as a troubled process of subject formation for rural youth, particularly rural young women, the countryside figured as the ideological high ground, functioning as a vast classroom where sent-down urban youth could be reacquainted with the revolutionary spirit of the peasantry. In those radical years, the Dazhai Brigade was promoted as the national model and, as Kirkby observes, "It was the farms rather than the factories that dominated the self-advertisements of Cultural Revolution China" (1985:5). Although scholars debate whether the development policies of the socialist period carried an antiurbanism (e.g., Chan 1994; Kirkby 1985; Naughton 1995), there seems to be agreement that the development policies at that time unlinked the symbiotic connection between industrialization and the privilege of the city assumed in the liberal market economy; both the cities and the countryside were enveloped in "hard struggle, plain living" (jEanku pusu).
The rural population perceived the difference between the countryside and the city as that between peasants and workers (Potter 1983) , which was expressed in their different sources of rice. Workers in the state-owned industries ate state rice: They were guaranteed food rations and other essentials by the state; peasants, on the other hand, had to work for their own rice and had limited medical care and educational facilities supported by the production collective.26 Note the equation of the city with workers during the Maoist period. The city signified a secure and desired welfare in the arms of the state; it was also a site of modern industrial production.27 I argue later that, in the post-Mao development strategy that reorganized the relationship between city and countryside, the city commands a different signifying power for rural young women.
In the post-Mao period, the hallmark of modernity engineered for the national imaginary through policies of "reform and opening" (gaige kaffang) is the insertion of the nation into the global market economy. The remarkable increase of foreign direct investment in China, the growth of exports from China to the world market, and the rapid expansion of the domestic service sector are underpinned by China's access to cheap migrant labor. This epistemic reorientation and restructuring has ushered in the process by which the rural is spectralized for the urban center telos.28 In what follows, I examine this dual process the spectralization of the rural and the rise of the city in economic, ideological, and cultural dimensions.
Beginning with the Third Plenary Session of the llth Chinese Communist Central Committee in 1978, the cities began to emerge as the engines of economic growth, occupying the high center in the post-Mao development discourse of constructing a commodity economy (shangpin jingZi), marking a radical departure from the policy line in the Maoist era. This switch from "production" city to "entrepreneurial" city in China's development strategy (Solinger 1993) paralleled what David Harvey (1989) has described as the transformation in the advanced capitalism of the 1970s and 1980s of "managerial" cities (managing social services) into "entrepreneurial" cities (fostering investment and development), as the changed mode of city governance in the logic of flexible accumulation and circulation. Four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were established in 1980 along the coast to attract foreign investment, thereby completing an ironic and dialectical return of the colonial "treaty ports" a return with a difference in the era of flexible accumulation. In 1984, an additional 14 coastal cities were promoted to SEZ status. The system of key cities (zhongdian chengshi) was restituted to allow a special class of 15 cities in 1981 (17 in 1982) access to a concentration of resources and more autonomy in decision making, to expand as nexuses of a commodity economy and to maximize the advantages of economies of scale. In a speech in December 1982, Premier Zhao Ziyang made one of "ten great principles for the development of the economy" reliance on big cities to construct economic centers (Solinger 1993:208) . As Kirkby observed about this tendency toward agglomeration, "There is no reluctance to admit that the chief purpose of this arrangement would be to strengthen the hierarchy of cities and regions. The prevailing view amongst China's economists today is that the institutionalising of such inequalities will accelerate national economic growth" (1985:225). Beginning in 1983, a restructuring of administrative hierarchy through the program of "city administering counties" (shiguanxian) freed the city from the administrative constrictions of prefecture (qu) to organize agricultural and peasant labor resources from surrounding counties formerly administered by prefecture to meet urban needs (Chan 1994:105) .
With the economic and administrative restructuring that has privileged it, the city has also been renewed as the privileged space of modern civilization and civility (xiandai wenming), gesturing toward elusive capital and development.29 In this discourse, it appears that Modernitry and Progress, which themselves are the ideological effects of postMao modernist imaginary, are given their permanent residency in the city. As Schein observes, "The city, however conceived, has become an object of increasingly intense desire in the era of reform" (2001 : The material production of the countryside as wasteland in the economic strategy of state investment is symbiotic with the ideological construction of the countryside as a wasteland of"backwardness" and "tradition." To borrow from Benjamin, one might say that "tradition," used in negative opposition to modernization and development, is a signifier whose signified cannot be fixed but grows like the "piling of wreckage upon wreckage" that the storm of Progress keeps blowing and hurling back as its antithesis ( Heshang urges intellectuals to fulfill their historical agency in the task of national regeneration. Critiquing Heshang, Jing Wang observes that "tradition" and, synonymously, the countrJvside, are not treated as "an autonomous system of representations" but become "derivative" when they are evaluated in a new epistemology in which a hostile modernity has appeared as dominating and unmarked (1996:130). The discourse of enlightenment reconstructing the countryside as the wasteland of tradition while development policies opened up the coastal cities as special portals for overseas connection and investment harks back to the parallel discursive practice of the early decades of the 20th century that similarly produced the city and the countryside as the primary contradictions within its project of colonial modernity. Tani Barlow (199la) points out that both nationalist enlightenment projects borrowed the authority and power of an imagined Western (read: universal) modernity and produced remarkably similar representations of "Chinese tradition."
The spectralization of the rural is much more deeply articulated in the relationship between peasants and land in many rural areas the land of production is turned into the last welfare land. Labor migration from the countryside to the cities is termed by scholars and the Chinese government "the transfer of surplus rural labor power" [nongoun shengyu laodong li zhuanyl0, but the irony is that the migrants, rather than "surplus" labor, consist mostly of better educated rural youth who are most needed for innovative agricultural production. Those who stay behind to continue farming constitute what is often called the 773861 army "77" refers to the old (i.e., 77 year olds), "38" refers to women, typically married women ("38" is March 8, InternationalWomen's Day), and "61" refers to children Uune 1, International Children's Day).37 In rural areas of Anhui and other provinces, the exodus has caused the de facto abandonment of land (paohuang), which has raised alarms.38 In Wuwei it is common for peasant households to plant only once a year instead of twice a year, for which the local term is "half abandoning" (ban paohuang) or "covert abandoning" (yinxing paohuang). Unlike it did in the early 1980s, grain production has stopped bringing income growth. Most people I interviewed said that they farm just for basic subsistence (bao koulisng). Private enterprises, domestic and transnational, draw millions of able-bodied migrants to work in sweatshop conditions with no insurance protection. The injured, the debilitated, the ill, and the unemployed are thrown back to the countryside each year in the tens of thousands.39 The countryside has become a reservoir releasing and absorbing labor according to the capricious needs of the market and supplies a flexible army of migrant laborers for a postsocialist carnival of accumulation in which national and transnational businesses share in the banquet of profits.40 When and where the migrant worker wage cannot sustain reproduction of the next generation in the city, such reproduction is carried out in the countryside. The land distributed to each household by the rural reform in the early 1980s was designed to spur agricultural productivity through privatizing production. Yet in the l990s, production land has become welfare land absorbing ill, injured, and unemployed bodies and enabling a cheap reproduction of the next generation of migrant workers. "Household responsibility land" thus becomes the last means of welfare and labor reproduction. The process of spectralization is a process of violence that appropriates economic, cultural, and ideological values from the countryside. The problem for rural youth is that they cannot find a path to the future in the withering countryside. The discourse of modernity in the post-Mao era thus produces the countryside both materially and ideologically as a wasteland stripped of state investment and inhabited by moribund tradition, with the two dimensions mutually reinforcing each other. If Modernity and Progress reside in the city and the city monopolizes the culture of modernity, then the countryside is the city's spectral Other. It is in this discursive context that the countryside cannot function as the locus of a modern identity for rural young women and that I interpret the despondent remark "There is no way out in the countryside" to mean "There is no path to modernity in the countryside." As Anthony J. Cascardi (1992:179) argues, "The culture of modernity is given shape as a divided whole that can only be unified through the powers of an abstract subject, or its political analogue, the autonomous state. Indeed . . . the state . . . provides the means through which the divided subjects of modernity can be made whole" (Liu 1993:171). Yet, we also need to be attentive to what happens in the post-Mao era if the discursive linkage between rural-youth subjects and the state snaps especially to rural young women, whose discursive linkage with the state used to be the ideological icon of Iron Girls. Rural youth live awkwardly and uncomfortably in the postMao era, trapped as modern subjects in the space outside the culture of modemity. Almost all of the 59 young women I interviewed in Wuwei left home on their own initiative, and almost half of them (26) did not have their parents' approval for their migrancy, at least initially.43 Although some of them were able to change their parents' minds, a fair portion of them simply fled home, often with friends (tou pao). Since the educational reform emphasizing professionalization after the Cultural Revolution, schooling provides, in conjunction with mass media, a routinization that rehearses rural youth for a resplendent future of urban modern subjectivity. Thus, for young women, everyday life at home in the countryside entails what might be termed the domestication of youth. Whatever their educational attainments, the young women of Wuwei overwhelmingly cited as their reason for migrating the fact that everyday life at home was inert (meijin) and "meaningless or boring" (mefyisi). They usually did not elaborate on this assessment, suggesting that rural life is so devoid of content and meaning that it can offer nothing for description and its emptiness can best be signified by the void suffusing the words inert and meaningless.
What is at issue here is not simply how bad rural life is for young women and how much better urban life is. What is critical is how the ideological and material rise of the city
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The description "inert and meaningless" was also given to me as self-evident reality, which automatically makes sense to me in the discursive context of rural-urban relations-the city is where everything happens, whereas the rural constitutes only the lack. In his study of urban Japanese life in the 1920s and 1930s, Harry Harootunian argues that "rather than being an inert experience of facts, everyday life was increasingly seen as the site that revealed symptoms of societies' deepest conflicts and aspirations" ( Recalling the words of Liu Li, Xiazi, and the Hubei girl seeking "reincarnation" in Shenzhen, how to have a modern subjectivity becomes an issue of whether life is worth living at all in the countryside, where "there is no path to the future." After the new society rescued the White-Haired Girl, a subaltem, from the field of death and enabled her rebirth as a modern subject (ren), the problem of having personhood (zuoren) has again become a grave issue for rural young women in the present historical moment. As in the case of the Hubei girl, who was almost killed in the factory blaze in Shenzhen, yet who returned in search of reincarnation to be ren the countryside is invoked as a field of death where a woman's modern subjectivity is smothered when she "always moves around the stove." Whereas the White-Haired Girl achieved her modern subjectivity in the liberated rural base, the site for realizing a modern subjectivity for rural young women in the post-Mao development era has decidedly shifted to the city. This epistemic shift, an ideological and material effect that draws on all the power of the development strategy that has spectralized the rural, is a discursive violence that forces the rural-urban split on these young women's conception of personhood and modern subjectivity. another lowland, from one kind of despair to another despair.... I have just learned that one room will be taken away from this family and they can no longer employ me. Perhaps I will have to be on the street at dawn.
-letter from a young girl to the editor of NongBianu Baishitong, Xie 199547
This girl from rural Shandong Province was caught in a conundrum in her pursuit of a modern personhood in the city. She despondently asked, "I came to Beijing stubbornly to look for something. I looked for something and what did I find?" She found that the gaze of her employer stripped her of humanity and dignity to make her "at best . . . a piece of high-class commodity." The sadness that seeped into her bones and that she could not resolve came from her realization of the overdetermined contradiction existing at the core of her pursuit of a modern personhood. In the context of post-Mao development, the very condition enabling such women's entrance to the city, the center of commodity economy, is that they themselves be disposable commodities of migrant labor power. Thus, the very condition enabling their entry and existence in the city fundamentally disables the possibility of attaining the modern personhood for which they have struggled. The girl from Shandong realized that she only stepped from the lowland of home into the lowland of the city. The city proved not to be a high place of hope; it merely displaced her old despair with a new despair. The conundrum persists: Between the country and the city, these young women have no place to pursue a modern personhood. The conditions and contradictions that have enabled and are constitutive of young migrant women's search for modernity also overdetermine their inability to become subjects of modernity and development. Thompson 1963) . Similarly, articulations of "gender" not subordinated to "class" were viewed as expressions of politically aberrant bourgeois liberalism (Young 1989) , mirroring the peasants' challenge of their subject position in the worker-peasant alliance as redolent of the petty bourgeois tendency toward "absolute egalitarianism."
Conclusion
The dual character of the sign "peasant" is split and distributed onto images represented by two kinds of peasants: the poor peasant that embodies the progressive rural proletariat and the rich peasant that epitomizes the backward small producer. In the socialist period, the state hailed the newly liberated poor peasant subject as an enthusiastic producer contributing to the industrialization of the new nation-state and to the ultimate industrialization of agricultural production. Industrialization in turn would transform the peasant class itself into a rural proletariat with advanced means of production and diminish the difference between workers and peasants (Potter and Potter 1990:300-301). Later, in the late 1970s, it was the individualistic "small producer" character of the peasantry that was given ideological ascendancy by the post-Mao regime as the real and rational nature of peasantry and that was seized on as the raison d'etre for economic liberalization, including the breakup of collective farming.
10. See Kirkby 1985 for the context in which industrialization took precedence in the national economy.
11. Although the unified procurement system that enforced a low price for grain is responsible for the near stagnation of the rural sector, Tim Oakes (2000) notes that up to one-third of the state's procurement of grain was transferred to grain-deficient rural areas at subsidized prices to alleviate the threat of hunger. Oakes argues that "China's remarkable success in reducing its mortality rate by more than half in less than two decades three times as fast as comparable countries-can largely be attributed to the success of its egalitarian grain redistribution policies" (2000:308) . Such policies disappeared with the dismantling of the planned economy in 1985.
12. Perkins and Yusuf (1984) show that in the late 1970s, value inflow into the countryside exceeded outflow, thereby beginning to reverse the trend in the previous decades of agriculture heavily subsidizing urban industrialization. 32. See Mobo Gao 1999:177-179 for a detailed discussion of how the reform has impacted rural income. Gao particularly argues that the increase in agricultural production and rural income should be attributed to the government's raising of agricultural prices and the relaxation of the procurement system rather than to the muchhailed "household responsibility system." When the government lowered the procurement prices and tightened the monopoly of state procurement in 1985, production significantly dropped.
33. The rough Chinese-U.S. currency exchange rate in the late l990s was 8.3 yuan = $1.00. The following is a typical calculation that I was given in Wuwei's rice-growing villages: 1,200 jin rice/mu x 60 yuan/100 jin = 720 yuan/mu (1 jin= 1.1 pound). Production costs: 70 yuan to borrow ox for plowing, 100 yuan for pesticide and fertilizer per mu, 15 yuan for water pump, 270 yuan for taxes and fees. Net income: 265 yuan/mu. A yield of 1,200 jin/mu is considered a bumper harvest. Harvests usually hover around 1,000 jin/mu. I was given slightly different figures for harvest yields, production costs, and fees in different villages. But the net income of 200-300 yuan/mu for rice growing is widely confirmed.
For cotton growing, I was given the following figures by a township accountant: 500-600 jin unginned cotton/mu-300 yuan/100 jin unginned cotton= 1,500-1,800 yuan. Production costs (seeds, fertilizer, and pesticide): 300-400 yuan/mu; taxes and fees: 200 yuan/mu. Net income: 1,000-1,200 yuan/mu. A village accountant provided a much lower estimate: 160 jin ginned cotton/mu -670 yuan/100 jin = 1,072 yuan/mu. Estimates of production costs, taxes, and fees remained the same. Net income: 472-572 yuan/mu. The cotton price was lowered ten percent in 1998. Although there is a set of criteria for measuring the quality of cotton and each grade of cotton is given a fixed price, local cotton collection stations vary in their assessment of the quality of the fiber turned in by peasants. That directly affects the prices peasants get for their cotton and may account for the different estimates. Villagers tend to support the second estimate, especially because they were hit hard by a widespread pest attack on their cotton in 1998. Cotton growing is much more labor intensive than rice farming. In Wuwei, townships that are located near the Yangtzi River and that have sandy land typically grow cotton, whereas inland townships grow rice. Cotton-growing townships have generally been better off than ricegrowing townships. 41. This is not to say that the specifics of their local cultural and gender dynamics do not matter in shaping their experiences of migration. From my interviews in Beijing, I found that women from Anhui, Sichuan, Henan, Shandong, Gansu, and so on, face important common problems as migrants. It is the connection and commonality of migrant women that I am interested in exploring here.
42. Liu Li is the eldest in the family and has two younger, teenaged brothers. She is from a mountainous county in Henan, where the main product is wheat. Because of deterioration in the management of water controls and the irrigation system, a not uncommon problem after post-Mao decollectivization, they are visited by alternating drought and flood, which reduces wheat productivity by half. To subsidize their meager agricultural income, her father and one younger brother who had quit school engage in the backbreaking labor of loading and transporting rocks to a construction site.
According to Liu Li, villagers stereotype migrant women on the basis of representations in government campaigns against pornographic activities and through soap operas on TV involving migrant women and their rich male patrons.
"Feudal" or "old feudal" are phrases that attained common currency in the countryside in the Maoist era to label certain thoughts or people who constituted obstacles to establishing gender equality or a more democratic familial relationship in which women and the younger generation are supposed to have some say.
To find a woman a "mother-in-law's house" is to plan to marry her off. This expression, which is often used in rural areas, manifests a patrilineal principle that is mediated by the senior figure of mother-in -law.
43. Of 104 women I interviewed, 16 are married women in their twenties and thirties who have never being migrants. Although some of them have family reasons, most of them cited illiteracy as the major obstacle to their migration. The attitudes of the parents of two of the women who had migrated on their own were not clear, and one young woman's parents had passed away before she migrated by herself at age 17.
44. During my entire stay in rural Wuwei, I only saw one young woman working in the fields.
45. Mao's analysis of the layers of oppression experienced by peasants in semicolonial Chinese society is well-known. Mao pointed out that rural women, in addition to bearing the mountains of oppression also experienced by their menfolk, were subjugated to the power of their husbands (ff>qan).
46. This gendering practice bears resemblance to the gender discourse in l9th-century England that marked working-class women as insufficiently gendered (Armstrong 1987 The girl expected to lose her job because of housing difficulties. The house or apartment in which her employers lived was provided
